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New Department Working Paper

Jun 22, 2022


McMaster University, Professor of Economics, Seungjin Han and University of California, Professor of Economics, Siyang Xiong, together have posted the working paper titled, Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment

Inspired by Szentes' critique (Szentes (2009)), we study common agency models with non-delegated contracts. In such a setup, we prove that the menu theorem in Peters (2001) holds partially only under some particular information structure, and we use examples to show that it fails generally. Furthermore, we prove a menu-of-menu-with-recommendation theorem in our models. Finally, we show that our results can be easily extended to common agency with imperfect commitment a la Bester and Strausz (2000, 2001, 2007).


For the full set of working papers  please see:
RePEC/ideas (